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State of the art  
Evaluation on the field of S&T contains a set of different practices, with diverse origins and 
trajectories, that converge and co-evolve in a policy domain, generally named as "science 
and technology policy". 
Research evaluation and evaluation of S&T policy  
Science and technology had been professional practices that from their origins had set up 
mechanism for internal control. Research evaluation could be seen as a system for control 
of the quality and relevance of the results of research. The most common this control 
practices had been peer review. When patrons, mainly the State, developed the research 
funding system formal peer review procedures started to be used and developed as 
instruments for allocation of funds to research institutions and groups. This extension of the 
internal control mechanisms of science to the allocation of funds for research had become 
a widely used instrument, in particular in the realm of basic and fundamental research, and 
a central element of the legitimisation cycle. 
The development of the so called strategic R&D programmes show the extension of 
steering activities, selecting priorities, and direct allocating funds by governments. At the 
same time the increase relevance of technology and innovation issues in government 
agendas helped the development and consolidation of specialised S&T policy-making 
bodies and bureaucracies; new actors in the RTD system, that have different needs of 
information and knowledge about the S&T dynamics and process, through whom new ideas 
of S&T (policy) evaluation were introduced. 
Evaluation is "examining" or "making judgements" (all cognitive process for action include 
assessments), and policy evaluation could be understood as part of the historical process 
of development of tools and information systems for public management. But the 
development of evaluation of S&T policies had evolved mainly from the transformation of 
the professional control practices of researchers and from the specific forms of 
management of RTD programmes.  
The term S&T policy evaluation include activities and practices that usually looks back at 
the past performance of programmes or policies (or sometimes as they are implemented, 
as in continuous or real-time evaluation) and they are part of the S&T policy cycle as is 
traditionally described (design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, redesign). S&T 
policy evaluation refers to "retrospective or ongoing examination" of programme 
performance or impacts.
There are other practices such as appraisal that refers to the activities developed at the 
beginning of a programme or project (what is sometimes called ex-ante evaluation, often 
related to a selection process for funding or other purposes) or monitoring. In general, 
evaluation and monitoring can be seen as part of control activities in the policy cycle, with 
few differences in addition to the more or less "judgement" and to their position in the 
temporal sequence of the "policy process". 
The boundaries between those activities are fuzzy and subject to interpretations; depending 
on the country, the organisational arrangements to carry on those activities diverge in 
important ways; the use and impacts of evaluations are highly local and contextual; and 
they are developed in specific national settings and arrangements.  
The national systems: forms and uses of S&T policy evaluation in Europe  
From the analysis developed at ASTPP network it appears that no one single practice or 
use of S&T policy evaluation had been established in Europe. Fragmented national or 
sectoral (and sometimes regional) arrangements for S&T policy evaluation dominate the 
scene. Furthermore no clear tendency towards convergence or towards single institutional 
arrangements appear possible in short term. 
The evaluation of S&T policy practices take a wide different forms and functions. Its 
development is embedded in the research system of the different countries. There is a tied 
association between the properties of the S&T systems and the uses of evaluation; these 
arrangements could be understood as a part of the "national systems of innovations". 
The forms along which those evaluation practices are developed, the extent to which they 
are established and institutionalised in the decision or policy making process are very 
different. That diversity could be linked to the forms that control activities were developed 
on the specific historical pattern of rationalisation of the different States. It is still difficult to 
identify typologies of these national models, but there are cases that are relevant for 
understanding of S&T policy evaluation in Europe:  
? UK appears to be ahead in the development of the evaluation; strong pressures from 
the government and the operators of the R&D system had help in the establishment 
of procedures and performance standards for evaluation. While in Netherlands, 
despite the will of the authorities in favour of the evaluation, the role of the operators 
in the implementation characterises a system with a lot of mutual accommodation and 
informal evaluation procedures.  
? Lack of systematic approach to evaluation is the main characteristic of many of the 
countries. In some cases, as Germany, a failure to establish a systematic 
understanding of the role and practice of the evaluation in the policy system, despite 
the large experience in evaluation, is probably explained by the institutional diversity 
and differentiation of the policy system.  
? In other countries where the State has strong napoleonic traditions, like France or 
Spain, the S&T evaluation -at different degrees of development- had become 
characterised as the "guarantor model".  
? In the majority of the countries the dynamic forces that favoured the development of 
evaluation had come from domestic forces involved in the S&T policy process. 
However in some others, like Greece and Portugal, where the S&T policy had growth 
associated to the use of the European Structural Funds (FEDER), the evaluation had 
become a requirement impose by external forces (European Community rules) for 
legitimisation of the good use of funding.  
? Most of the countries had evolved in their approaches to evaluation, as the cases of 
Finland, Austria or Spain, and had move all long a clear trajectory. But at the same 
time in many countries, like Netherlands, Spain or others, appears that evaluation 
activities are still not linked to a decision making context.  
Techniques and methods used for evaluation of S&T policies and programmes are not 
standard all over Europe. These are developed as a customised activities. Ad hoc 
procedures are developed to assess the management, performance and impacts of the 
S&T policies, but still there is a big influence, when assessing quality or relevance, of peer 
review based procedures. 
Is this diversity going to survive?. Interaction and ideas determine that professions (all long 
to the EU scene) could develop common approaches; but institutions matters and we will 
observe the persistence of diversity, between the different practices of S&T policy 
evaluation, and TF or TA, in their use in the countries.  
S&T policy evaluation and the changing S&T system  
Different normative proposals had been made on evaluation in relation to public policy: In a 
limited context of rational process the evaluation is trying to reduce the deficit of information 
of the decision-maker and its utilisation is an after-decision problem. (managerial vision). 
However other approaches had considered that the definition of problems varies and the 
main function of evaluation confronting the interest of stake-holders is one of 
enlightenment. (debating on formation and aims). A third approach to evaluation see its 
potential as strategic management tool, as specific form of co-ordination between actors 
that help to develop learning loops and strategic considerations in S&T policy process. As 
programmes and policies had become organisers of interactions and relationship between 
actors, management and evaluation become part of co-ordination of interactions. That 
activity of evaluation, when become institutionalised. could be part of the actors' co-
ordination mechanism. 
S&T policy evaluation is part of a set of cognitive practices, that often become 
institutionalised, developed in a context defined for the specific forms of interactions 
between actors. Diversity here is related to the fact that most of the interactions are local 
and contextual.  
S&T policy evaluation developed in the early eighties, in the context of a changing research 
system, and was one of control practices promoted by different actors. In Europe some of 
the actors involved in design-implementation of S&T policy have pushed in favour of the 
development of those new tools. The analysis of the S&T policies and programmes had 
become relevant at the same time that policy-makers and RTD managers had developed 
as independent actors trying to improve control on their interventions. In that way the new 
practice (in their version) become relevant because actors used it in their interactions. 
New actors in the research system (especially those associated with the management of 
the R&D and S&T policy) and outside (the Treasury Departments or Parliaments) had 
become part of the advocacy coalition of the new developments of S&T policy evaluations 
as analysis of the effects, impacts and performance of the programmes. The transformation 
of the forms of interaction between governments and research systems explain a lot of the 
features and characteristics of the S&T policy evaluation. 
These practices, and the specific information and knowledge production tools used, are 
linked to the actors that used them in their interactions in the S&T policy system. Different 
actors have diverse interpretations on S&T policy evaluation. S&T policy evaluation 
appears as a local cognitive practice (socially constructed) that is used by some of the 
actors involved in the policy-making and political systems. S&T policy evaluation, as activity 
promoting learning and change, need to develop a coalition of social forces supporting it, a 
group of committed users. And the fact is that many different configuration of coalitions had 
been formed in the different countries. 
In the world of action intellectual design and social interaction coexist. Problems are 
discovered, solutions are attempted to solved and reformulated both by social exchange 
among organised actors and by their efforts to guide events along anticipated paths by 
purposive actors. But the extension of evaluation of S&T policy had suffer from stop and go 
process and perhaps many expectations had been located in this activity as source of 
rationality, control or co-ordination.  
Outputs and functions of S&T policy evaluation  
The outputs of evaluation exercises, the regular products of those processes are: policy 
analysis, recommendations and general advice for decision and policy-making, that is 
information and knowledge. S&T policy evaluation is mostly based on retrospective 
analysis, in that way the general aim of S&T policy evaluation is to inform post-programme 
decisions and, because it is often related to the appraisal of subsequent programmes or 
projects, both activities are closely interrelated. (They also share some of the techniques 
and tools used for their work, as is the case with peer review). The evaluation studies, in 
the sense of impact analysis of S&T policy programmes, could be understood as trying to 
prove the achievement of politically established scientific, technological, economic or social 
targets or to determine the overall performance of the S&T programme 
S&T policy evaluation consist in a process of production of knowledge and information by 
actors embedded in research, S&T policy or political systems; knowledge and information 
refers to different issues such us the associations between problems and solutions, or the 
properties and effects of policies and programmes. 
But S&T policy evaluation is not the only type of information or knowledge input about past 
experience in the policy process. Advice could come to the decision and policy process 
through very different channels and providers.  
Most of attention on S&T policy evaluation derives from the need for accountability (with 
was the main force in pushing evaluations at governmental level at the end of the 80s). 
Different types of S&T evaluations were launched because of accountability problems at 
the different levels of the policy and political systems. This problem link to one more 
general of principal-agents relations in the S&T system. Researchers and firms should be 
accountable to bureaucrats in Government and funding agencies; funding agencies had to 
be accountable to the Ministry of Finance; Government action had to be accountable to 
Parliament, etc.  
The accountability problem results from the interactions between actors, that use 
knowledge and information to make interpretations. The uneven development of the actors 
and their resources could explain part of the national variation (e.g. the growth of 
professional evaluators, etc.) but in the context of increase complexity in the S&T system 
(new actors, more interactions between them) there is a increasing need of information and 
knowledge about the S&T system that could help actors to co-ordinate (mediate and 
negotiate) themselves in this complex environments. 
Once this kind of S&T policy evaluation practices are in motion they produce effects and 
impacts in the forces modelling the RTD system and in the way of understanding public 
policies. Then S&T policy evaluation becomes part of the tension between legitimisation 
and criticism; between conservatism and change; between exploitation and exploration. 
The result had been diverse evaluation patters growing in the different countries, in very 
different institutional contexts, with practices being wide-ranging, and with systemic 
functions and users wills showing an great deal of diversity:  
? improving management, targeting, controlling and fine-tuning of S&T policy 
programmes and enhancing the information and knowledge bases of the S&T 
policies,  
? provision of legitimisation for the distribution of funding and the demonstration of 
adequate, effective and efficient use of it by assessing the quality of the management 
of the programme, measuring the scientific/technological quality or determining the 
socio-economic or structural impacts,  
? improving transparency in research funds allocation and establishment of the rules for 
S&T system in the sense of a government-led guarantee or regulation between 
diverging and competing interests of various players within the S&T system,  
? creating negotiation spaces and shared interpretations between the different 
Government levels in the sense of moderation.  
Evaluation produce information and knowledge; in addition the availability of information 
and the process of evaluation provides legitimisation; it offers transparency and fair play 
between the players in the S&T system; and it creates a shared space of interpretation for 
the negotiation between conflicting interest involved in the increase complex game of S&T 
policy in Europe. 
Legitimacy, control or moderation are functions, but they are very dependent on how it is 
organised the social process that any evaluation involves. At the same time the different 
cognitive practices play different roles in relation to the actors; for example, the appraisal 
produces legitimacy for the programmes, in front of the research communities (because 
they guarantee that the funding and selection is fair), while programme evaluation produces 
legitimacy for the programme management in front of other actors (as politicians, etc.)  
What role for S&T policy evaluation in S&T policy?  
The results of the evaluation could be information and knowledge; but how these inputs 
become a tool for the S&T policy planning?. Is the evaluation a tool for improving S&T 
policy? 
Users of that knowledge want legitimacy, control and fine-tuning or analysis of policy 
rationale. Evaluations could produce effects in organisations, as creation of units of 
evaluation, introducing strategic planning or definition of an agenda for research, and future 
funding. But the effects are only produced in the case that ideas and arguments are taken 
up by some of the actors. 
It have been mention that, in practice, in most of the countries there are not clear links 
between the evaluation exercices and the management and decision-making levels. More 
and more S&T evaluation are commissioned but still appears that their uses are far for 
been integrated in the S&T policy process. That 's not mean that their finding have no 
effects. Probably the way that evaluation exercises influence the future decision and policy-
making is slower than expected. 
There are also in many cases serious organisational barriers to the absorption of the 
evaluation findings. The dominance of traditions more concern with the determination of 
legality than with the assessment of performance and the lack of institutionalisation in the 
policy-making process as part of systematic feedback loop, are also limits. 
An even greater area of failure of evaluation is the fact the evaluation is almost confined to 
close circles of decision-makers and, in some cases, to the clients of the programme. 
General public and users of S&T are almost absent of the actual game of evaluation. 
Those weakness of the evaluation of S&T policy in Europe refers more to the environment 
of S&T policy-making. There are other intrinsic limits to "evaluation". Evaluations are 
making conclusion on the past performance, establishing causality relations between 
different elements of the system, and could help to create shared understandings, but that 
is not enough to deal with the basic elements need to make decisions on future actions. 
Evaluation alone could only play a partial role in reinforcing the strategic aspects in S&T 
policy planning. 
ASTPP aims are related to the improvements of methods, but also with the development of 
normative models and prescriptive proposals for practical improvement of the way how S&T 
decision-make is organised, but those proposal are always trying to be empirically funded 
and theoretical plausible. 
The actual practice of "monitoring and evaluation" of the EU RTD programmes  
The European Commission had played, in the eighties and beginning of the nineties, a 
relevant role in the promotion and support of the capabilities for S&T evaluation S&T. 
Relevant methodological developments, case studies, and so on were commissioned by 
the EC through activities organised mainly through MONITOR programme. But when the IV 
FP was approved a specific program, TSER, included within its objectives the advance of 
knowledge in "science and technology policy options", including methodological 
developments. But most of the funding had been subject to a regular competitive bids in the 
frame of "calls". 
At the same time that the practice of evaluation of RTD programmes had become 
institutionalise, and the evaluation unit had been consolidated in the DG XII, and the unit 
have recently been allocated in DG XII AP on charge of the Framework Programme. 
However that momentum had not been isolated from the general initiatives of the European 
Commission. In 1994/95 the EC asked a group of experts to review the existing 
Commission practice of evaluation and recommend improvements. Following from this 
report, and within the general framework of what is called the "SEM 2000" initiative (Sound 
and Efficient Management) and internal communication on evaluation, entitle "Evaluation: 
Concrete steps toward best practice across the Commission", outlined a strategy for action 
to strengthen the evaluation of EU programs. This general trend had strong "financial 
management" content because "the results of evaluation of Community actions, undertaken 
periodically, should be taken into account in decisions concerning budgetary allocations" 
After the document "Towards implementation of coherent monitoring and evaluation of 
Community RTD actions" issued by CREST (1208/95, 19 May 1995) and the Commission 
initiative SEM 2000, the Commission had produced a communication on "External and 
independent monitoring and evaluation of the Community activities on the domain of 
RTD" (COM(96)220 final). 
The proposal of the EC for monitoring and evaluation of programs should be accomplish 
through two types of actions referred to FP and the specific programmes: i) continuos 
monitoring with the help of external independent experts and preparation of an annual 
rapport; and ii) five years mid-term assessment, done by external independent experts that 
have to include the conclusions of the final evaluation reports of the previous FP and 
specific programmes. 
The two activities of monitoring and evaluation have different nature because the "five-
years assessment" report of the FP, in addition to the comments of the Commission should 
be send to the EP, CM and ESC before the presentation of the proposition for the new FP. 
The aspects that should be included in the reports are: the coherence between the 
selection of projects and the objectives of the programme; the efficiency of the 
management of the programme; etc.  
The binding approach to evaluation is very much linked to the assessment of the 
management and implementation of the programme. No obligation appears to be referred 
in relation to the "impacts or effects of the S&T programmes" as criteria. Those activities, as 
a practice are not forbidden, but due to the fact that the European Commission is 
responsible of the monitoring and evaluation of the RTD actions; those type of evaluation 
become dependent of the entrepreneurial initiatives of the Directorates. 
At the level of the S&T policy represented by the Framework Programme the practice of the 
monitor and evaluation have take the dominant form of "panels" of independent external 
experts. The "independence" of evaluators could be viewed as a way of increasing 
credibility, linked to the variety of actors involved and the complexity of the decision-making 
process, but in practice the S&T programme evaluations are organised with low budgets 
and not many people (usually 3 for monitoring panels or 5 mid term five years assessment), 
that are increasingly dependent on the provision of information and support by the 
implementation directorate. In addition independent evaluators are selected directly by the 
RTD management unit. From the situation appears no limit to the fact that managers of 
specific programs could request evaluations from professional evaluators (teams instead of 
panels) but in practice with low budget it not appears very feasible. 
In relation to the role of the European Commission confronting S&T policy evaluation, two 
different situation emerge. In one side, still appears committed to the promotion of 
knowledge and methodologies in S&T policy options, because it had been established as 
formal domain for Targeted Socio-economic Research. In the side of practice, it looks a 
pragmatic approach for "control", but with asymmetric participation of the key actors in 
policy design and decision-making. The practice of the monitoring and evaluation in the 
Community RTD actions is very much oriented to program management issues and 
objectives. A lot of the present situation of S&T policy evaluation in the Community action is 
linked to the concerns on sound and efficient management" as a way of legitimisation and 
control, and specially of the fulfilment of scientific and technological objectives. 
The apparent impasse on S&T policy impact studies could be either the result of the fact 
that this kind of evaluations are dependent on the entrepreneurial initiatives of the 
management units or that the increasing involvement of countries in close monitoring of the 
Framework Programmes (through Programme Committees) had created a new attitude of 
the Commission regarding the production of sensible information that could be used by the 
national Governments against EC interest. At the end the European Governments are the 
principals of the Commission. Because one way in which the EC use some evaluations (or 
other forms of policy analysis) is to resume its initiatives (permanent innovation) and to 
escape from the control of the countries. 
But appears that the results of evaluations or policy findings have a lot of room to be 
introduced as inputs in redefinition of the S&T policies, mainly through the process of 
consultation (inter-services and with governments and interest). That is a positive aspects 
of the institutional constraints of the European Union. And, at the same time, as 
Governments enter into the implementation procedures of evaluation and monitoring S&T 
policies (no matter that for controlling the European Commission) more is disseminate the 
culture of evaluation within them. 
Confronting complex foresight environments with strategic S&T planning: synergies 
between TF, TA and S&T policy evaluation  
S&T systems had growth in complexity and many new actors are now involved. In this 
system there are many agents acting with conflicting preferences, and trying to advances 
their interests in their interactions. A single actor can not calculate the consequences of its 
actions because, as a result of the complex interactions, S&T system changes. A new 
feature of S&T system is that the foresight horizon is complex, because the structure of the 
S&T world (included the policy-making) is also changing due to the interactions. This kind 
of world cannot be easily explored because is under construction by the actors interactions. 
In this kind of system there are two nested processes with strategic relevance: The first is 
cognitive: the actors provide identities and populate their world by locating which agents are 
there and constructing explicit interpretations of what these agents do in what kind of 
situations. The second is structural: the actors foster generative relationship between 
agents, mostly through interaction, relationships that produce new attributions of identities 
that cannot be foreseen in advance. Confronting this kind of complex foresight horizons a 
key issue becomes the organisation of the processes of exploration and adaptation.  
Traditionally strategic had represented a commitment to a planned or established long term 
course of action. And the selection of a strategy meant to optimise between different 
alternatives on the base of calculation of future consequences and their probability. But the 
notion of what is strategic in this new type of environment must also include understanding 
how changes come about. In these situations strategic means "the means to achieve 
control". Since the outcomes depend on the interactions with and between many other 
agents (inside and outside the p-m boundaries), strategy represents an attempt to control 
the process of interactions. But the problem is that In this type of complex situations control 
is distributed. 
No one can predict what will emerge from the constructive dynamics. But if the forces 
(actors) in motion that produce the generative relationship are associated in the processes 
of attribution of meanings and identities with a system of monitoring their relationships, to 
assess the potential for generativeness, and "ongoing" and ex-post interpretation 
(attribution of identities and meanings) we could improve our ability to deal with complex 
foresight horizons. Here are located the challenges that S&T policy planning has to face.  
Strategy becomes a process consisting of a set of practices (that could include in a special 
location TF, TA and S&T policy evaluation), in which agents inside the policy-making 
process structure and interpret the relationship inside and outside the p-m process, through 
which they both act and gain knowledge about their world.  
Then we can recommend the development of activities that associate both the cognitive 
and the interactive side of the process. Unpredictability requires ongoing re-interpretation, 
but making sense is not enough. Agents must monitor their relationships for fostering the 
generativeness, and those processes in policy and politics are carried out through 
negotiations, through mutual adjustment. In that way the use of tools and cognitive process 
that bring together the actors to "negotiate" are basic to guarantee the increasing 
adaptativeness to changes. 
Two concepts are relevant for understanding the role of information in organisation for 
decisions and actions: uncertainty and ambiguity. While uncertainty can be solved 
(reduced) by obtaining (elaborating) additional pieces of information (in that sense the 
development of engineering decision tools is central), ambiguity cannot be solved simply 
gathering information. Ambiguity is a state of having many ways of thinking about the same 
circumstances or phenomena, and in that way more information is not directly relevant for 
solving the ambiguity. The extent that we can come to a consensus about it, depends on a 
process of interpretation (what is relevant, what is value to give, etc.). But no matter that 
information could not be relevant for decision, could be useful for exploring ambiguity. 
Ambiguity can only be resolved by shared agreement, reached through a process of 
interpretation; and interpretation is giving meaning before it can be acted. 
In addition also mostly policy situations are characterised by bunches of actors involved 
with conflicting identities and preferences. And the system should allow us to make a 
decision, but without eliminating the divergence of identities and preferences, without 
solving the inconsistencies. 
There are not single approach on how to deal with uncertain foresight environments. There 
are to basic models for decision-making, both are useful for describing the empirical world 
in a realistic way, and both largely reflect different aspects and needs of decision-making 
process. But any of those two basic ways of understanding the process of decision-making 
(the logic of consequentiality, the consequences that could be used for explaining, and the 
logic of temporality, where the explanations come from the sequence of events) have 
diverse informational need to operate. Trying to gain "intelligence" requires different 
thoughts, depending on what logic we apply: the logic of consequence and the logic of 
appropriateness are equally logic of thoughtfulness, and the cognitive demands for each 
are substantial. 
In the logic of consequence, there are requirements for knowledge about the future and for 
consistency and clarity in preferences. In rational models information is a means of 
choosing options of a satisfactory solutions and the information needed is a function of the 
goals specified. In the case of a logic of appropriateness, there are requirements for 
knowledge about the situation and for consistency and clarity in identities. In decision under 
ambiguity models information is useful for exploring problems and solutions, discovering 
preferences or maintaining lines of communications. 
Under appropriate circumstances action based on either logic can lead to achieving 
outcomes that are judged to be attractive or contribute (over some time horizon) to survival 
advantage. However, neither rational exchange nor rule-following (and the learning and 
selection of rule that lies behind it) is assured of being intelligent. The intelligence of each 
depends on the ways in which their imperatives are interpreted and on the extent to which 
capabilities for meeting them exist. Here comes the proposal of ASTPP for creating this 
capabilities through the association of EVA, TF and TA in an intelligence system for 
strategic or adaptative learning. 
European S/T policy is confronted with a number of heterogeneous challenges that call for 
highly intelligent and well informed "holistic" procedures of policy planning and decision-
making. A "reflexive S/T system" is emerging - but still fragmentarily, and it turns out that 
basically all three "pillars" (TF, TA, EV) are involved: they remain different activities, but not 
independent, and all three are points of access to this emerging system. 
TF, TA and S&T policy evaluation have been developed as cognitive process (to provide 
enlightenment -calculations and interpretations- to the decisions) by different professional 
communities, supported by different actors and understood in different ways. But if these 
cognitive activities are to have impact on strategic policy-making process they need to be 
developed in association with all the relevant actors involved in the process to help to foster 
the generative relationship between agents that could tackle with the complex foresight 
horizons that S&T policy planning represents. It must be clear that the role of information 
and knowledge production systems (about future and past) in policy-making -more than 
simply to make choices- is to help, trough the attribution process, in the generative 
interactions for increasing the adaptativeness to the changing environment. 
As it has been stated above any strategic S&T policy has to deal with three important 
elements: uncertainty, ambiguity and conflict of interest. The three different tools could be 
used to reduce uncertainty of future (TF), to learn from the past through shared 
interpretations reducing ambiguity (EVA), and to deal with the divergent preferences of the 
actors (TA). Through this three process we increase the strategic aspects (adaptativeness) 
of the S&T policy. The concrete prescriptive proposal by ASTPP of the articulation of EVA, 
TF and TA, as part of a system of information and knowledge production, could play a 
mayor role in defining the tools for dealing, in an strategic way, with the challenges of 
complex foresight environment that S&T policy have to confront. All three practices had 
developed as independent streams but they have complementary (or synergetic) properties 
in relation to some features necessary for considering the strategic aspects of S&T policy. 
EVA is a central tool for learning, if we consider that learning (in organisations) is a process 
of encoding inferences from the past that guide behaviour. It can be learning form 
experience or from others, but also from development of conceptual frameworks or 
paradigms for interpreting that experience. The process of evaluation could create shared 
interpretations and understandings between the actors in S&T system. But in its present -
even the most advanced forms- EVA lack the capability either to define criteria for future 
action different that those encoded in the past or the capability to deal with the negotiations 
of the conflicting interest involved in S&T policy process.. 
Bringing TF to the strategic approach of S&T policy planning we are dealing (engineering 
procedures for monitoring the generative relations between actors and artefacts) with the 
reduction of uncertainty. We open the door for having scenarios of the future that are 
necessary for an adaptive capability of the S&T policy to the changing environment. 
Including TA in the tool kit of strategic planning will help to solve some of the major 
deficiencies of the present state of the EVA (an in part of TF). We will take its capability to 
deal will the conflict of interest or the diversity of preferences in a "negotiated" form, in that 
way we will be able to monitor the generative relations that are basic to the functioning of 
the S&T system. 
But no matter that EVA, TF or TA could bring some specific competencies to the strategic 
intelligence system we still need work on the methodological aspects of the links.  
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